Can Emissions Trading Work Beyond A National Program: Some Practical Observations on the Available Tools by Fort, Jeffrey C. & Faur, Cynthia A.
CAN EMISSIONS TRADING WORK BEYOND A
NATIONAL PROGRAM?: SOME PRACTICAL





Over the past ten years, the concept of emission trading has
become the darling of innovative regulators and business people
in the United States. The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act contained the first nation-wide emission trading program for
the reduction of Acid Rain.' Several regional air quality districts,
like the South Coast Air Quality Management District (-
"SCAQMD") Regional Clean Air Incentives Market ("RE-
CLAIM") program in California, and the State of Illinois, have
also developed emission trading programs to enable them to attain
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for
various pollutants.2 Most recently, in the context of ongoing
meetings of the subsidiary bodies of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development Framework Convention
on Climate Change ("FCCC"),3 the United States has proposed
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a tentative framework for an international emission trading
program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.4
Under the United States Draft Protocol, each participating
nation would be assigned an "emission budget," which would be
reduced over time.5 To satisfy emission requirements, participat-
ing nations could trade emission reductions with other nations or
use their own "banked" emissions from previous years.6 The
program also requires reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from
developing nations and provides incentives for these countries to
join the trading program.7
Proponents of emission trading hope that such trading can
provide an effective vehicle for addressing global warming issues.
Indeed, many features of the global warming debate appear to fit
the key criteria for an emission trading program. Advocates of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions to prevent global warming
assume, with varying degrees of scientific evidence and support,
that there is a limit or "cap" on the amount of greenhouse gas
emissions the Earth can withstand and still promote life on the
planet as we know it. Using the concept of a cap, greenhouse gas
emissions can be allocated among parties using this valuable
resource. Given the difficulties associated with the allocation of
these emissions, however, development of a market-based system
in which all interested parties can participate appears to be an
attractive option. Under such a system, allocated emissions,
which are essentially "rights" or "entitlements," are put forward
as the currency for the efficient allocation of resources.
As appealing as this strategy appears, the details can - if not
carefully addressed and resolved - destroy the progress promised
by champions of emission trading and global warming controls.
For a trading program to be successful, allotments must be
considered in the same way as currency or property rights are
addressed. The treatment of air resources may be analogized to
the treatment of real property rights centuries ago, and perhaps
more importantly to the currency creditability issues that were
ECON. L. 689 (1997).
' See U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Draft Protocol Framework, January 17, 1997
[hereinafter "Draft Protocol"].
I See id., art. 2.
6 See id., arts. 6, 2 para. 5.




problematic in this country until fairly recently!
To make emission reductions through emission trading vital,
there must be sufficient criteria to enable private parties to make
reliable economic assessments. The broad discretion evident in
the current proposals must be eliminated if the benefits of
emissions trading are to be realized.9 To be useful, an interna-
tional emission crediting program must be based on objective and
certain criteria, unfettered by governmental restrictions for a
known period of time.
The following are some observations concerning the issues
which must be resolved in order to implement a viable interna-
tional emission trading program. While there is much to be
improved, the Draft Protocol is a beginning from which trading
ideas can be inserted.
2. THE OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL EMISSION TRADING
2.1. Is There a Consensus on the Resource?
Most developed countries concur that the global warming issue
must be addressed. The debate is whether we know enough now
to begin setting emission reduction targets or if it is already
getting perilously late in the process. First, there must be a
consensus that there is a need for action; second, there must be a
general consensus on the time table for that action. Developing
countries are concerned that setting such reduction targets could
impose a severe impediment to their growth.
The U.S. proposal appears to straddle these concerns by
proposing a program containing specific budget periods." The
Draft Protocol also calls for "emission budgets" by signatory
countries.1 How these emission budgets are to be set presents
the initial impediment to a global program.
In this connection, it is instructive to recall the silver crises, and the issue
of whether the dollar should be tied to the international price of gold.
9 See discussion infra section 2.
10 See Draft Protocol, art. 2. The Draft Protocol proposes specific budget
periods for developed countries. Allowable emissions would be reduced in each
subsequent perioc[. While the Draft Protocol does not specify emission budget
periods, the United States has indicated it should focus on a "medium" term of
approximately ten years. See U.S. Dept. of State, Fact Sheet on Climate Change
Proposal, "Negotiations Background and Calendar," January 17, 1997.
" See Draft Protocol, art. 2.
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Establishing the time table and emission reduction targets
provides a start. One of the remaining questions, however, is
whether the targets are to be measured strictly by emission
reductions on a country-by-country basis, or whether the emission
budgets allow for "offsetting" emissions, such as by maintenance
and enhancement of forests and other vegetative masses which
convert carbon dioxide to oxygen. Allowing such "offsets" may
or may not be environmentally justified. Such "offsets" may or
may not facilitate an agreement for an international treaty.
It is useful, in this regard, to recall the earlier analogy to
currency. 2 If the currency is continually being valued and
devalued, the risks inherent in making a trade - unless those risks
can be quantified and limited - will frustrate transactions.
Similarly, until the offset issue is resolved and emission budgets
specified, emission trading on the international level will be
frustrated by vague criteria.
Emission credits based upon rate of emissions (i.e., relative
efficiency) do not address the "Tragedy in Commons" perspective
of governmental regulators. There has not been an effective
emission reduction program associated with emission trading that
did not have a "cap" aspect to it. Hence, without an "emission
budget," international trading is not likely to succeed.
2.2. Feasibility
The feasibility, both politically and technically, of capping
power generation is a critical issue. The United States has
historically favored relative efficiency as a method of defining
acceptable emissions. The Environmental Protection Agency's
"New Source Performance Standards," "Reasonably Available
Control Technology" requirements, "Best Available Control
Technology," and "Lowest Achievable Emission Rate" are all
defined in terms of emissions per unit of production. Capping
emissions, however, suggests a limit on production. Indeed, until
the Acid Rain program under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act, the notion of capping emissions related to power
generation was novel.
Capping emissions does not, however, necessarily mean that
power demands cannot increase. It does mean that efficiency of




units of production of power must be improved. This sets up
competition among fossil fuels (natural gas versus petroleum
versus low sulfur and high sulfur coal), and potentially between
developed and developing nations on the international scale.
The debate over capping emissions, however, presents several
difficult issues. One of the potential problems concerns the
relationships between stack emissions of carbon dioxide versus
carbon dioxide consumption by vegetative cover. Another
divisive issue underlies the support (or lack thereof) for exporting
innovative and efficient technologies, or for improving energy
utilization.
These issues make clear that a global approach will require
innovative support and financing for developing nations to ensure
that they can afford the kinds of efficient production systems, and
the accompanying monitoring systems, necessary to meet the
expectations of the Draft Protocol. The remainder of this essay
focuses on the technical issues that must also be resolved to
facilitate international emissions trading.
2.3. Can the Emission Credits be Quantified?
Once the emission budget is determined, a second critical
condition is how the credits can be quantified, and the trustwor-
thiness of that quantification. Based upon the first few years of
the Acid Rain Program, supporters of emission trading argue that
trading has resulted in significant early emission reductions. It is
not clear, however, that emission trading will work in every
forum. In California, SCAQMD's RECLAIM program for
hydrocarbons purportedly failed because it tried to focus on very
small emission units, and covered a wide variety of very small
sources. As evidenced by the Acid Rain program and the early
emission offset trading programs, emission trading will only work
for those industries with sufficient expertise to accurately monitor
and quantify their emissions.
The successful emission trading programs cap total regulated
emissions.13 Development of an emission cap for the region,
13 Other emission trading programs which are credit-based can also enable
industry to comply with environmental regulations in a cost-effective manner.
These programs, however, do not result in mandatory emission reductions.
Indeed, concern over "paper offsets," and over the possibility that offsets for
new sources would not achieve real environmental progress, led to several EPA
policies in the 1980s which effectively stifled trading. See Emission Trading
1997]
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however, requires extensive emission data for all sources slated to
be in the program. Despite the emission quantification require-
ments of the various state implementation plans, many regions of
the United States do not currently have the necessary emission
information.
Some air quality management districts have developed the type
of emission data necessary to implement an effective emission
trading program. One such district is Illinois. In 1996, the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency formally proposed a
"cap and allocate" trading program for the severe ozone non-
attainment area surrounding Chicago.1 4  Under this proposed
program, all major sources with more than ten tons of volatile
organic material emissions during the summer months will be
issued trading allotments for use during the ozone season. 5 Each
source's initial allotment will be decreased by twelve percent from
its baseline emissions.1 6 To comply with the requirements of the
program, each source must possess, at the end of the emission
reconciliation period, allotments equal to its seasonal emissions."
Illinois has been able to develop this program for several
reasons. First, Illinois has a long history of environmental
regulation. The state has had an operating permit program for
sources of criteria pollutants for over twenty-five years,18 and
major sources in the Chicago non-attainment area have been
subject to significant reporting obligations under the Chicago
Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP") since 1990.19 Due to this
Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43815 (1986). The 1990 Amendments responded
by mandating extra emission reductions offsets for major sources of volatile
organic compounds located in non-attainment areas, and for the Acid Rain
program. See 42 U.S.C. % 7511a, 7651 et seq. (Supp. II 1990).
14 See In the Matter of: Emission Reduction Market System, Adoption of
35 111. Admin. Code 205 and Amendments to 35 ill. Admin. Code 106, No.
R97-13, 1996 ill. Env. LEXIS 848 (Dec. 5, 1996).
15 See Ill. Re&. (to be codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35,
205.200).-Te Polluti--Control Board anticipates submitting the rules cited
in notes 15-17, 23, and 29 for First Notice publication in the ilinois Register
in Spring or Summer 1997. See 21 Ill. Reg. 1431, 1439(o (1997).
16 See Ill. Reg. 1 (to be codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35,
§ 205.400(c)).
17 See ill. Reg. __ (to be codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35,S205.150(c).
18 See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 201.143-201.144 (1996).
19 See 40 C.F.R. S 52.741 (1996). The FIP has been superseded by the rules




history of regulation, emission sources in the Chicago area, along
with the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, have devel-
oped the sophisticated emission quantification knowledge
necessary for the implementation of an emission trading program.
Additionally, since sources in the Chicago non-attainment area
have been subject to stringent environmental regulation for many
years, these sources understand the benefits that emission trading
has over traditional command and control requirements. Unlike
traditional command and control programs, the proposed Illinois
trading program provides sources that can control emissions in a
cost effective manner with the incentive to exceed emissions
reductions requirements by giving them value for these excess
reductions. The program also enables smaller sources for which
control is prohibitively expensive to comply with emission
reduction requirements by purchasing allotments on the open
market. Thus, the program furthers both business growth and
environmental improvement.
Accurate quantification, however, is difficult. Sophisticated
emission monitoring and recordkeeping is often required. Even
in the United States, with its extensive history of environmental
regulation, certain sources do not yet have sufficient emission
quantification information to make the emission baseline determi-
nation necessary for participation in a trading program. Many
other developed, not to mention developing, countries do not
have the necessary building blocks in place to quantify emissions
accurately.20
Quantification of emissions is essential for the success of any
trading program on the international level. Accurate quantifi-
cation is necessary not only to determine the overall emission
"cap," but also to create confidence in the emission trades that are
to be made. Participating sources or nations will not likely trade
emissions with other parties if they cannot accurately quantify the
emission reductions. Emission quantification, therefore, goes
directly to the integrity of an international trading program.
Fortunately, greenhouse gases may be measured if those gases
are defined and emission budgets set. Most typical power plant
20 While the ISO 14001 series may help, that protocol is systematic, not
substantive. An extra level of specifications, such as one derived from the EPE
("Environmental Performance Evaluation") protocol (ISO 14031), will likely be
necessary in the implementation of a larger scale trading program.
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emissions can be monitored in a variety of non-capital intensive
ways that are consistent with basic fuel input. Measurements
based upon information that is normally kept for production
purposes can be confirmed with periodic stack tests or other
emission testing to yield an emission factor. Verifiable monitoring
can thus be tied to basic production characteristics, provided
operational characteristics are represented by the emission factors.
This method of emission calculation has been used at fossil fuel
power plants for several decades. Similar emission calculations,
however, have not been done routinely for other types of
greenhouse gas sources. The experience in developing emission
trading programs in U.S. non-attainment areas like Chicago, as
detailed in this section, highlights the need for workable quantifi-
cation systems to faciliate trading, both within the United States
and on the international level.
3. How WILL THE PROGRAM BE IMPLEMENTED?
Once a consensus has been reached on the resource to be
protected and accurate quantification methods have been adopted,
the knotty issues of implementation arise. These issues include:
enforcement, industry participation, duration, environmental
impact, and the establishment of a viable market.
3.1. Enforcement
The first issue to be addressed is the appropriate method of
enforcement. An effective enforcement mechanism ensures that
the emission credits being generated or sold are valid, and thereby
fosters confidence in the market. Lack of proper enforcement will
defeat efforts to trade emission credits, even between entities with
readily quantifiable and verifiable emission estimates.
Where emission budgets or emission inventories are based on
faulty or incomplete information, the trading program participants
who have precise data are handicapped and potentially put at a
competitive disadvantage. These countries will be reluctant to
participate in an international trading program without proper
incentives. Similarly, there must be an incentive for countries
with currently incomplete or inaccurate emission data to require
industry in those countries to implement acceptable emission
quantification standards. An effective enforcement mechanism is
essential as it provides one such incentive.




"incentives." It is not the heavy-handed, command-and-control
enforcement long favored by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"). It should be in the nature of quality assurance,
data validation, and other evolving concepts that are not focused
on penalizing the offender, but rather verifying the emission
quantification. Again, the systemized standards being developed
for Environmental Management Systems and Environmental
Performance Evaluations may provide a norm and accepted
practice.
3.2. Industry Participation
Even if there were monetary incentives for countries either to
join the emission trading program or otherwise to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases, it is unclear whether these
incentives would adequately compensate private industry. The
cost of training employees and performing emission quantification
may be relatively large. As evidenced by the history of emission
trading in the United States, without the support of private
industry, emission trading cannot be successful.
The Draft Protocol sets a national emission budget.21 This
type of budget, however, leaves the negotiations concerning
emission allocations at the nation-state level rather than encourag-
ing industry involvement. Thus, the Draft Protocol does not
create a private market for industry. Under the Protocol,
individual industries will not be able to negotiate with industries
in other countries to set quantity and price for credits without
government involvement. This interjection of government into
the negotiations will ultimately result in a price determined by
political goals rather than one set by market forces. This price
will not reflect market concerns; as such, at least one of the
parties to the trade will not be adequately compensated. The
wronged party will thus be less likely to continue to participate
in the market. Eventually, the market will be non-existent. To
prevent this failing, any international program should enable
industries to negotiate amongst themselves with minimal govern-
mental oversight.
Similarly, an international emission trading program must
enable innovative industries to generate emission credits. During
21 See Draft Protocol, art. 2.
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the early years of emission trading in the United States, emission
credits were often subject to stringent "special conditions." These
conditions were often subjective, and laden with extra require-
ments that created disincentives for credit generation, rather than
incentives to reduce emissions.
To avoid the pitfall of discouraging participation by industry
in the trading program, the program rules must set forth specific
criteria for generating and obtaining recognizable trading units.
The criteria must be objective and verifiable; generation of
emission reductions cannot be left to the subjective judgment of
parties who may have an interest in either keeping emissions
within their borders or obtaining certain concessions in exchange
for certifying inadequate emission credits. Given the nature of
international diplomacy, which often results in concessions in one
area to gain strides in another, the need for clear, straightforward,
and objective rules is apparent.
3.3. Duration
Emission reduction credits in the United States are defined by
time. For a company to install a new facility or make a signifi-
cant modification to an existing facility, the EPA requires
essentially permanent emission reduction credits.' In other
instances, states may define the life of an emission credits
seasonally' The Acid Rain trading system under the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act uses allotment units with a
defined lifetime of a few years, at the expiration of which the
allotments may be reduced.24
The Draft Protocol, however, ignores the importance of
setting the duration of emission reduction credits. The Draft
Protocol employs the concept of borrowing emission reductions
from one budget period as against the next.2s  This is not
without justification since the general issue is not whether the
ambient air quality level is set according to a duration of one
hour, twenty-four hours, or even according to an annual average.
Nevertheless, the concept of essentially "borrowing against the
future" suggests a lack of rigor and commitment to reductions.
2 See 40 C.F.R. 5 51 app. S (1996).
' See _ Ill. Reg. _ (to be codified ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, S 205).
24 See 42 U.S.C. S 7651d.




Moreover, without a specified duration for the life of the
credit, the business and environmental risks are undefined and
international trading is not realistically possible. Sources, whether
they are acquiring or selling emissions credits, must have certainty
as to the validity of the unit that they are acquiring. The
duration of the unit needs to have a minimum life from economic
perspectives; from an environmental perspective, there must also
be an upper limit on its duration. Fixing the time period reflected
by the unit avoids many of the controversies that have plagued
the emission marketing systems prior to the 1990 amendments to
the Clean Air Act. Indeed, establishing a definite life for a credit
can encourage industry participation in an international trading
program by facilitating long term planning for businesses, to the
long-term benefit of the environment.
3.4. Environmental Impact
The successful emission trading approaches in the United
States take a long-term view as to environmental improvement.
One of the greatest difficulties of the 1970 Clean Air Act was its
use of three-year deadlines for achieving national ambient air
quality standards.26 The only way to reduce emissions on such
a short-term basis is to install add-on pollution control equipment.
These add-on controls, however, transfer the pollution issues from
the air to the water, land, and in some instances back to the air.
Technology and customer approval requirements do not move so
quickly. Since many of the pollution prevention efforts affect the
product itself, product specifications must be taken into account.
A successful emission market system, therefore, must rely on
longer time periods, on the order of ten years or longer, to
achieve environmental goals. The chlorofluorocarbon ("CFC")
phase-out under the Clean Air Act (which is really another type
of "cap and allocate" system) allows for ten years.2 The Acid
26 States were required to attain the ambient air quality standards set by the
EPA within three years. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c). Three years is generally
enough time to install an end-of-pipe system, such as a scrubber, baghouse, or
thermal oxidizer. It is much too short a time for implementation of product
substitutes or pollution prevention measures.
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 7671a (1996); The Montreal Protocol on CFCs also
requires a phase-out of CFC uses. See Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1989).
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Rain allowance program has an allocation schedule extending over
fifteen years.2" Similarly, Illinois' emission reduction market
system envisions a ten year planning cycle.29 The Draft Protocol
takes long-term planning into account by setting "middle term"
objectives for the reduction of greenhouse gases.30
By using these longer schedules, planners can demonstrate an
environmental benefit associated with emission trading systems,
while providing business with the ability to make long-term plans
and, potentially, to develop less polluting materials. This sort of
schedule would avoid the application of the "hurry-up" approach
of very short time tables which foster "end-of-pipe" approaches to
environmental control31 in the development of an international
trading program.
3.5. Is There a Market?
There must be a market to facilitate an effective resource
allocation in an international emission trading program. Ad hoc
exchanges are more akin to a barter system than to any market as
we understand it today. The sharing of information concerning
available and mandatory emission reductions can only become a
reality if the tools are in place to enable the dissemination of this
information. These information-sharing concepts have been
generally alien to environmental regulators, particularly in the
"command and control" system developed by the United States
and often shared by other countries.
The sophistication of other countries is a necessary element in
any sort of global trading strategy. While American expertise in
environmental monitoring may need to be exported to facilitate
the development of an international emission trading system, the
sophistication necessary to implement this type of a program can
also be fostered by educational and related infrastructure improve-
ments. Use of an ISO 14001 and EPE process, specifically tied to
greenhouse gas or global warming issues, might provide a
framework. 2 The World Bank may also have a role in promot-
ing the creation of the infrastructure necessary for environmental
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651a et seq (1996).
29 See __ IU. Reg. _ (to be codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 205).
30 See supra note 10.
31 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.





Without this sort of broad participation, a true global market
will not occur. While there may exist opportunities in very
specific situations to "trade" something of value related to
greenhouse gases, the notion that such trading can occur rests far
in the future, even if a consensus is reached on the desirability of
such a global program.
4. CONCLUSION
While there are several obstacles to the development of an
international emission trading program for greenhouse gases, the
establishment of such a program could have great benefit. Not
only could the program encourage innovation in developed
nations, but the program could also provide developing countries
with the incentive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by giving
those reductions economic value. The net result would be more
efficient energy production and fewer emissions of greenhouse
gases. These reductions, however, may not occur on a precise
schedule; therefore, regulators and diplomats must be patient and
allow the program to operate.
The Draft Protocol proposed by the United States in January
1997 does not meet the criteria of a successful privatized emission
trading program. Indeed, privatized emission trading programs on
an international scale may not be attainable. For such a trading
program to be successful, it is critical that it provide adequate
certainty to the participants that emission reductions are real and
quantifiable, and the program must provide sources with sufficient
notice of required emission reductions to facilitate long-term
planning. Such a program, if developed and implemented, could
enable both developing countries and mature economies to
participate in a cost-effective program designed to slow or
eliminate global warming.
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